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Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation:  
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan†
By James B. Bushnell, Stephen P. Holland,  
Jonathan E. Hughes, and Christopher R. Knittel*
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan sets goals for CO2 emissions rate 
reductions by 2030 that vary substantially across states. States 
can choose the regulatory mechanism they use and whether or not 
to join with other states in implementing their goals. We analyze 
incentives to adopt rate standards versus cap-and-trade with theory 
and simulation. We show conditions where adoption of inefficient 
rate standards is a dominant strategy from both consumers’ and 
generators’ perspectives. Numerical simulations of the western 
electricity system highlight incentives for uncoordinated policies 
that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination. (JEL H76, Q53, Q54, Q58)
Within the United States, state-by-state variation in regulatory approaches has been more of the norm than an exception. For example, within the utility 
industries, individual state regulatory commissions have used substantially different 
variations on the rate-of-return regulatory framework, while some states have cho-
sen to rely on wholesale power markets instead of vertically integrated utilities. In 
the environmental realm, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has often 
deferred to state or local air quality regulators to develop specific implementation 
plans to achieve the EPA’s environmental mandates. The Clean Air Act, one of the 
dominant environmental regulatory instruments, requires the EPA leave regulatory 
decisions up to individual states.
In electricity markets, the regulatory actions of states, or even local communi-
ties, often affect the market outcomes in surrounding areas because electricity flows 
throughout regional networks. In the climate change policy arena, California and 
states in the northeastern US have faced this issue with their unilateral adoption of 
cap-and-trade programs limiting carbon emissions from in-state sources. In both 
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instances, there have been concerns that such actions could spur “leakage” of both 
emissions and of beneficial economic activity to the neighboring uncapped regions; 
specifically, while emissions may decrease within the regulatory jurisdictions, emis-
sions may increase elsewhere as output increases from unregulated power plants.1
A more subtle form of economic spillovers can arise when individual states 
respond to regulatory requirements with different instruments. The choice of instru-
ment affects each power plant’s opportunity cost of selling electricity. Therefore, 
certain policies may provide a competitive advantage to power plants within a par-
ticular state, and this advantage will depend on the policies adopted in other states. 
In the face of these incentives, it is not clear the equilibrium outcome will yield an 
efficient mix of policies.
Recent actions by the EPA to address greenhouse gas emissions create a simi-
lar dynamic. In this case however, the stakes are much higher than the examples 
above. The EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) proposes major reductions in carbon 
emissions from electricity generators in the United States. Focusing on the elec-
tricity sector, the CPP uses existing provisions of the Clean Air Act to regulate a 
substantial share of carbon emissions. Due in part to inaction at the federal level, 
recent US climate policy has been driven almost exclusively by state and regional 
initiatives. This has raised concerns over inefficiencies from uncoordinated policies 
(Bushnell, Peterman, and Wolfram 2008). A national framework holds the potential 
to decrease inefficiencies created by the patchwork of state and regional policies and 
could improve US standing in international climate negotiations (Newell, Pizer, and 
Raimi 2012; Stavins 2008).
We analyze the potential effects of the CPP in terms of electricity market out-
comes and state adoption incentives using both theory and numerical simulation. 
The CPP establishes state-level targets for carbon emissions rates in lbs of carbon 
dioxide per megawatt hour of electricity generated (lbs per MWh). States can adopt 
the default rate standard or can instead adopt a “mass-based” regulation, i.e., a 
 cap-and-trade (CAT) system. Further, states can form coalitions by adopting either 
a CAT regulation or rate standard, or by trading “emission rate credits” across states. 
The effects on consumers and producers within a state depend on both the type of 
regulation adopted by each state and regulations adopted by its electricity trading 
partners. Furthermore, the states’ private incentives may be at odds with those of a 
national social planner.
We have five main results. First, we show industry supply, i.e., the merit order, can 
be efficient under a CAT regulation, rate standard, or mixed regulation. However, 
supply efficiency requires stringent conditions for rate standards or for mixed reg-
ulation. Moreover, supply efficiency is necessary but not sufficient for efficiency. 
Echoing earlier results in the literature, e.g., Helfand (1991); and Holland, Hughes, 
and Knittel (2009), we show that in general only CAT can be efficient.
Second, we illustrate important differences in the incentives of a unified coalition 
of states versus the incentives of a single state or of various stakeholders. For the 
coalition of states, adoption of CAT is best from an efficiency perspective. However, 
1 See Fowlie (2009) and Chen (2009). 
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for an individual state or for stakeholders the incentives are more nuanced and may 
result in an inefficient policy as a dominant strategy.
Third, we explore our theoretical predictions using a simulation model of the 
western interconnection of the US electricity grid. Relative to business as usual, we 
find that a West-wide CAT implementing the Clean Power Plan: increases social 
welfare by approximately $2 billion; decreases carbon emissions by 71 million met-
ric tons (MMT), about 21 percent; and has reasonable marginal abatement costs 
of $21 per metric ton (MT).2 Failure to coordinate policies results in a merit order 
which can be “scrambled” quite dramatically and in substantial deadweight loss. 
State-by-state CAT standards reduce social welfare by approximately $200 million 
relative to a West-wide CAT. The inefficiency is even worse under state-by-state 
rate standards. Mixed regulation creates the possibility of additional scrambling 
of the merit order as well as of emissions leakage, thereby introducing additional 
inefficiencies.
Fourth, we simulate the incentives of stakeholders and show that various stake-
holders have an incentive to deviate from a coordinated policy regime. From a pri-
vate surplus perspective, the coastal states would have an incentive to deviate from 
a West-wide CAT, and the inland states would have an incentive to deviate from a 
West-wide rate standard. Overall, these strategic interactions tend to result in unco-
ordinated policies across the regions.
Finally, we analyze how the design of CAT regulations affects entry incentives 
under the CPP. New generation may or may not be included in emissions caps for 
states that adopt CAT regulations. This creates the potential for emissions leakage 
via investment in new fossil fuel generation outside of the cap.
This work contributes to several literatures. Our findings echo concerns about 
environmental and economic spillovers from local climate policies. First, environ-
mental targets can be undermined if production is able to shift away from the juris-
dictional reach of the regulator through either leakage or reshuffling of production 
sources.3 Second, local regulatory programs are unlikely to lead to the efficient 
allocation of abatement across regions as marginal abatement costs are not equal. 
Third, regulatory action in one area may put firms in that region at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to firms in unregulated regions. These concerns have been a 
challenge for regional climate initiatives in the US. More generally, concerns over 
leakage have been a challenge for international climate agreements. In crafting the 
European CO2 market, as well as the now defunct Waxman-Markey bill that would 
have established a national cap in the United States, much attention was paid to 
the “competitiveness” question, which is fundamentally related to how vulnerable 
domestic producers are to leakage from imports.
Our theoretical model is most closely related to Fischer (2003). Fischer analyzes 
carbon trading between CAT and rate standards and finds trading raises emissions. 
We extend this work by analyzing two components necessary for understanding 
the CPP. First, we explicitly model trading in the product market, electricity, that 
2 The EPA’s analysis indicated average abatement costs from $4 to $36 per ton of carbon. (See tables ES-2, 
ES-3, and ES-5 of Office of Air and Radiation, and Office of Air Quality and Planning Standards 2015.) 
3 See Bushnell, Peterman, and Wolfram (2008); Fowlie (2009); and Chen (2009). 
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crucially affects the interactions of the states’ policy choices. Second, we analyze 
states’ adoption incentives for CAT and rate standards. Burtraw et al. (2015) also 
simulate electricity system outcomes under the CPP. They show the choice of allo-
cation policy can mitigate some of the perverse effects of inconsistent state regu-
latory choices. However, as we show here, states may not find it in their interest to 
mitigate those effects. Finally, our work also contributes to the literature on rate-
based environmental regulation.4
Section I discusses the Clean Power Plan in more detail and provides policy back-
ground. Section II develops the theoretical model and derives the theoretical results. 
Section III presents the simulation model and Section IV describes the results. 
Section V concludes.
I. The Clean Power Plan: Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act
Since the landmark 2007 decision by the US Supreme Court in massachusetts v. 
EPA, the EPA has taken several steps to limit GHG emissions under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA). A significant milestone occurred on August 3, 2015 when the Obama 
administration released the Clean Power Plan (CPP) regulating GHG emissions 
from existing power plants. Rather than following the usual permitting process, the 
CPP instead uses provisions in Section 111 of the CAA. Section 111 provides a flex-
ible framework for regulation, but also imposes constraints on the types of policies 
that may be implemented under the CPP. Regulation under Section 111 requires that 
the EPA establish “standards of performance” which are defined as “a standard for 
emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achiev-
able through the application of the best system of emission reduction.” The text also 
requires state-level implementation of the standards.
To estimate the best system of emissions reduction, the Clean Power Plan uses 
three “building blocks.”5 The first building block focuses on emissions reduction 
from fossil steam generation through heat rate (efficiency) improvements. The 
second building block focuses on shifting generation from relatively dirty coal-
fired plants to relatively cleaner gas-fired plants. The third building block requires 
increased generation from low emissions or zero-emissions generation (e.g., renew-
ables). Based on these building blocks, the EPA allows states to choose between rate 
standards, CAT regulation, and “state measures.” 6
Rate standards can be based on national or state-blended rates. National rates (in 
lbs CO2 per MWh) for existing fossil steam and natural gas combined cycle genera-
tion are based on the best system of emissions reduction.7 The EPA calculates rates 
separately for the eastern and western electricity interconnections as well as for the 
4 See also Huang et al. (2013), Pizer (2005), and Zilberman et al. (2013). 
5 The initial CPP proposal included a fourth building block for energy efficiency. While energy efficiency mea-
sures are not used to calculate the rate standards in the final rule, covered generators can still use energy efficiency 
programs to generate emission rate credits and can use the credits to meet CPP targets. 
6 The CPP defines “rate-based standards” and “mass-based standards.” We simply refer to “rate standards” and 
“CAT ” throughout. 
7 Fossil steam includes coal, oil, and natural gas steam generation units. Covered units are those capable of selling 
at least 25 MW of electricity to a utility power distribution system. New generation is not covered under the rate 
standard. 
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Electric Reliability Council of Texas. The national rates for each technology are the 
highest of the three calculated regional rates, i.e., the most lenient. State-blended 
rates are calculated as the generation-weighted average of the national rates based 
on each state’s 2012 generation (MWh) from fossil steam and natural gas combined 
cycle units. State-blended rates vary from a 0 percent reduction in the emissions 
rates for Connecticut, Idaho, and Vermont to more than a 38 percent reduction in the 
emissions rate for Montana. Figure E1 in the online Appendix shows the rate reduc-
tions states must achieve, on average, over the period from 2022 to 2029.
CAT standards can either include or exclude emissions from new generation. 
When new generation is excluded, CAT standards are calculated by multiplying the 
state’s rate standard target by the sum of the state’s 2012 generation and twice the 
EPA’s projected growth in renewable generation. When emissions from new gener-
ation are included, the CPP specifies alternate CAT targets. These standards allow 
for extra emissions called “new source complements.” This provides an incentive for 
states to include emissions from new generation under their caps. The average state-
level increase from new source complements for western states is about 4 percent.
Finally, under a “state-measures” approach, states can implement alternate regu-
lations, and not federal CPP rules, so long as the emissions reductions under the state 
rules are greater than the federal requirements. State measures could include exist-
ing market-based policies, such as California’s cap-and-trade law or the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast. Alternatively, these rules could take the 
form of more prescriptive renewable energy or energy efficiency policies.
To provide additional compliance flexibility, the CPP creates tradeable “emis-
sion rate credits.” A regulated generator earns emission rate credits when emissions 
reductions exceed the rate standard.8 Emission rate credits are also earned from 
increased generation using zero carbon sources or through energy efficiency mea-
sures that reduce total load.
Based on one of the standards above, the individual states must adopt compliance 
plans, either alone or as part of a coalition of states. The CPP neither compels states 
to adopt a CAT nor compels states to follow a regional approach. This flexibility 
could allow states to tailor their regulations to better fit their unique circumstances. 
Alternatively, the flexibility could lead states to adopt inefficient regulations that 
benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others and lead to significant impacts in 
other states.
Our analysis below focuses on the two main compliance paths, rate standards 
and CAT regulation. While the state-measures approach does allow for alternate 
prescriptive policies, most states will likely adopt one of the market-based policies, 
which are the subject of our analysis. To the extent prescriptive policies change 
the implicit or explicit costs of clean and carbon-intensive generation, our analysis 
captures many of the forces at work in less market-oriented policies. Further, since 
prescriptive policies are likely less efficient than the market-based policies we study 
here, our results represent an upper bound on welfare gains under the CPP.
8 Using our notation, the number of emission rate credits (ERCs) generated is given by:  Er C i =  q i ×   σ s −  β i  _____ σ s  .
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II. The Model
Consider a model of electricity generation and consumption in multiple states 
(regions). Let  s index the states. Since electricity cannot be economically stored, 
prices vary across time if demand varies. Let  t index hours and assume electricity 
flows freely across the states so that the electricity price in hour  t is  p t and is com-
mon across all the states.9 Total demand at time  t is given by  D t ( p t ) and (net) con-
sumer surplus by  CS .10, 11
Supply in the model comes from a variety of generating units each with a con-
stant marginal cost of generation and a limited capacity. Since the generating units 
may be regulated differently across states, we differentiate generating units by their 
location. Let  i index the technologies (e.g., coal-fired, combustion turbine, etc.) and 
s index the states. Assume  c i is the marginal cost of generating from technology 
i  ;  q –si is the installed capacity in state  s of technology  i ; and  β i is the carbon emis-
sions rate of technology  i .
Under a market-based carbon regulation, costs also include carbon costs. Let  τ be 
the social cost of carbon, and let  r ∈ {BAu, CAT, rS} index the carbon regulations: 
“business as usual,” “cap-and-trade,” and “rate standards.”
Define the full marginal cost,  Fm C si r , as the sum of the marginal generation cost 
plus generators’ (private) carbon cost, i.e., the cost of any carbon permits.12 Below 
we define the full marginal cost for CAT and rate standards. In the absence of car-
bon regulation, i.e., in  BAu , private carbon costs are zero and  Fm C si BAu =  c i . We 
also define the full marginal social cost as the marginal generation plus social car-
bon costs, i.e.,  c i +  β i τ .13 Welfare,  W r , under regulation  r is defined as the gross 
consumer surplus less full social costs, or, equivalently, the sum of net consumer 
surplus, generator profit, and any carbon market revenue minus carbon damages.
The supply from each technology is determined by comparing the electricity 
price with the full marginal cost. Generators supply at capacity if the electricity 
price exceeds their full marginal cost, supply nothing if the price is below their full 
marginal cost, and supply any amount up to capacity if the price equals their full 
marginal cost.
The market supply is determined by aggregating the supply from each generation 
technology. The resulting market supply is a nondecreasing step function which 
orders the technologies by their full marginal cost. The order of the technologies 
along the supply curve determines the order in which generation units would be 
called into service as demand increases and is called the merit order.
9 In the simulations, we extend the model to include transmission constraints. Other transmission costs, such as 
system costs and losses, are assumed to not vary by regulatory scenario. 
10  CS is found by integrating under the demand curve and above the price and summing over  t . To analyze the 
distribution of consumer surplus,  C S s , across the states, we assume that each state’s share of demand is a constant 
fraction of total demand. We do not account for programmatic investments that would shift the demand curve. 
11 Our definition of consumer surplus is surplus in wholesale markets. Implicitly we assume that wholesale 
prices are (eventually) passed through to end consumers. Modeling the intricacies of regulated retail rates, e.g., 
increasing block rates, two-part tariffs, etc. is beyond the scope of this paper. (See Borenstein and Holland 2005 
and Borenstein 2012). 
12 We use “private” carbon costs to denote the portion of generators’ compliance costs from carbon permit 
purchases. This is to distinguish these costs from “social carbon costs,” i.e., externalities from carbon emissions. 
13 The full marginal social cost does not depend on the state or the carbon regulation. 
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The equilibrium electricity price in hour  t is found from the intersection of hour  t 
demand and market supply. Specifically, under carbon regulation  r , the price in hour 
t is given by
(1)  p t r = min {p : D t ( p) ≤  ∑ s  ∑ i Φ(Fm C si r ≤ p)  q –si } , 
where  Φ is an indicator function that takes the value one if the argument is true and 
zero otherwise. Thus  Φ(Fm C si r ≤ p) is one if  Fm C si r ≤ p , i.e., if technology  i is 
willing to supply at price  p and is zero otherwise. The set defined in equation (1) is 
the set of prices for which there is excess supply. The minimum of this set will either 
be a price at which demand exactly equals market supply when all inframarginal 
generators supply at capacity (i.e., on a vertical portion of the supply curve) or will 
be a price at which any smaller price would have excess demand (i.e., on a horizon-
tal portion of the supply curve).
Based on these equilibrium prices, we can now characterize the equilibrium gen-
eration and profits of each technology. If  q sit r is equilibrium generation in state  s from 
technology  i in hour  t under regulation  r , then profits are defined as
(2)  π si r ≡  ∑ 
t
 (  p t r − Fm C si r )  q sit r , 
for technology  i in state  s under carbon regulation  r .14 Finally, we define equilibrium 
carbon emissions as
(3)  Carbo n r =  ∑ 
s
  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
  β i  q sit r . 
A. Cap-and-Trade (CAT ) regulation
We now turn to equilibrium under a cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation limiting total 
carbon emissions. Let  E s be allowable emissions in state  s and  p cs be the price of 
tradeable certificates for one unit of carbon emissions in state  s . It is well known that 
such a cap-and-trade program raises costs of generators in proportion to their carbon 
emissions, and thus the full marginal cost of technology  i is  Fm C si CAT =  c i +  β i  p cs 
in state  s .
These full marginal costs are illustrated in panel A of Figure 1. The figure shows 
the marginal costs of four technologies: nuclear ( c N ), coal ( c C ), gas ( c G ), and oil ( c O ). As illustrated, the unregulated merit order would be first nuclear, then coal, 
then gas, and finally oil because  c N <  c C <  c G <  c O . If the emissions rates are 
such that  β O >  β C >  β G >  β N = 0 , the carbon regulation increases the full 
marginal costs of coal-fired generation more than of gas-fired generation due to 
coal’s higher carbon emissions. Thus as illustrated the CAT regulation switches the 
14 The equilibrium supply has three cases. If price is above marginal cost, then generation is at capacity. If price 
is below marginal cost, then generation is zero. If price is equal to marginal cost, we assume that each generator 
supplies the same fraction of their capacity  α sit r , where  0 <  α sit r < 1 . With a carbon policy  α sit r may need to be 
redefined such that the carbon market clears. 
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merit order of coal- and gas-fired generation. Market supply would be found from 
Figure 1 by reordering the technologies according to their full marginal costs.
If all states adopt CAT regulations, the equilibrium electricity price in hour  t 
is characterized by equation (1) with this full marginal cost. Generator profits are 
given by
(4)  π si CAT ≡  ∑ 
t
  ( p t CAT − Fm C si CAT )  q sit CAT =  ∑ 
t
  (  p t CAT −  c i −  β i  p cs )  q sit CAT . 
Thus generator profits do not include carbon market revenue, e.g., permits are 
auctioned not grandfathered, and welfare calculations must account for the carbon 
market revenue separately.15
To complete the characterization of the CAT equilibrium, we describe equilib-
rium in the market for carbon certificates. Since the supply of permits is fixed at 
15 Under CAT, stakeholder benefits depend on the distribution of the carbon market revenue. Throughout, we 
account for the CAT carbon market revenue separately rather than assign it to either consumers (ratepayers) or 
producers because its distribution is a question of policy. 
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Figure 1. Full Marginal Costs under Different Regulatory Regimes
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E s , demand equals supply in state  s when  ∑ i   ∑ t   β i  q sit CAT =  E s . Note that a higher 
carbon price  p cs decreases carbon emissions, so there exists a carbon price which 
clears the carbon market.
The above characterization of the market equilibrium under CAT assumes each 
state has its own independent regulation. The model is extended to allow carbon 
trading between states. If two states allow carbon trading, then the price of carbon 
certificates is equal across both states, and the carbon market equilibrium is char-
acterized by emissions equal to the aggregate cap. It is well known that allowing 
trading across cap-and-trade programs reduces the cost of achieving the aggregate 
emissions target. Furthermore, the equilibrium is invariant to the distribution of the 
cap across the states, i.e., only the aggregate cap is relevant.
B. rate Standard regulation
Next we characterize equilibrium under a rate standard. A rate standard lim-
its the aggregate carbon emissions per MWh of electricity and can be tradeable 
(see Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 2009). Let  σ s be allowed emissions per MWh 
in state  s . Any technology whose emissions rate,  β i , exceeds the standard would 
be required to purchase certificates per MWh based on the amount by which its 
emissions rate exceeds the standard. Conversely, any technology whose emissions 
rate is below the standard could sell certificates based on the difference between 
their emissions rate and the standard. Let  p cs be the price of tradeable certificates 
for one unit of carbon emissions. Thus the rate standard changes the full marginal 
cost of generators based on whether they are buying or selling permits. In particular, 
the rate standard changes the full marginal cost of technology  i in state  s from  c i to 
 c i + ( β i −  σ s )  p cs . Note that full marginal costs may be higher or lower than  BAu 
depending on whether  β i −  σ s is positive or negative, i.e., depending on whether a 
technology buys or sells certificates.
These full marginal costs are illustrated in panel B of Figure 1 for the four tech-
nologies. In the hypothetical illustrated, the rate standard reduces the full marginal 
costs of (i.e., subsidizes) nuclear- and gas-fired generation, but increases the full 
marginal costs of coal- and oil-fired generation. As with the CAT, the merit order 
under rate standards as illustrated switches gas and coal, i.e., gas-fired generation is 
used before coal-fired generation as demand increases.
Intuitively, the rate standard is equivalent to a tax of  β i  p cs combined with a sub-
sidy of  σ s  p cs . Whether the rate standard implicitly taxes or subsidizes generation 
depends on comparing the emissions rate with the standard. The implicit output 
subsidy has an efficiency cost (see Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 2009) but can also 
serve as a defensive mechanism to prevent leakage.16
If all states adopt rate standards, the equilibrium electricity price in hour  t is char-
acterized by equation (1) with these full marginal costs. Profits are
(5)  π si rS ≡  ∑ 
t
  (  p t rS − Fm C si rS )  q sit rS =  ∑ 
t
  ( p t rS −  c i − ( β i −  σ s )  p cs )  q sit rS . 
16 Output-based allocations are a similar defensive mechanism to prevent leakage (see Fischer 2001). 
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As above we assume that generators are not given permits. However generators 
with relatively cleaner technologies, for which  β i <  σ s , create permits by generat-
ing electricity. In this case, the term  −( β i −  σ s ) is positive and captures the revenue 
which would arise from selling carbon credits. Thus the profits capture all revenue 
streams and there is no carbon market revenue to be accounted for separately.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we describe the market for 
carbon certificates. The demand for carbon certificates is determined by the amount 
each technology exceeds the standard and by how much electricity is generated 
from each technology. For example, demand for certificates in state  s from technol-
ogy  i is  ∑ t  ( β i −  σ s )  q sit rS if  β i >  σ s . Similarly, supply in state  s from  technology 
i is  ∑ t  ( σ s −  β i )  q sit rS if  β i <  σ s . Because demand less supply equals zero in equi-
librium, the carbon market equilibrium is characterized by  ∑ i    ∑ t  ( β i −  σ s )  q sit rS = 0 . Note that a higher carbon price  p cs decreases demand and increases supply for 
carbon certificates, so there exists a carbon price which clears the carbon market. 
Note also that the equilibrium condition can be written to show that the aggregate 
carbon emissions rate exactly equals the rate standard in equilibrium.
The model can be readily extended to analyze two states who combine their rate 
standards through carbon trading. Suppose the states  s and  s ′ allow carbon certifi-
cates to be freely traded between the states. Then the prices of the certificates are 
equal, i.e.,  p cs =  p cs′ , and the equilibrium condition is that demand across both 
states equals supply across both states. Setting demand minus supply equal to zero, 
we can characterize the carbon market equilibrium by
(6)  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
 ( β i −  σ s )  q sit rS +  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
 ( β i −  σ s′ )  q s′ it rS = 0. 
This equilibrium condition can be written to show that the aggregate carbon 
emissions rate equals a weighted average of the allowed emissions rates across the 
states where the weights depend on generation.
In addition to trading carbon, which equates the carbon prices, states may also 
wish to harmonize their rate standards, i.e., to set  σ s =  σ s′ . Note that if states do not 
harmonize their rate standards, then the full marginal costs of identical generators 
can be different across states even if carbon prices are the same. In order to avoid 
this additional inefficiency, states would need to harmonize their rate standards as 
well as to allow carbon trading.
Combining rate standards across states does not have the efficiency justification 
of combining CAT regulations. Combining CATs across states allows the same 
aggregate emissions target to be attained at lower cost. Combining rate standards 
across states does reduce costs, but it also means that the emissions target changes: 
both the aggregate emissions and the aggregate emissions rate are changed by com-
bining rate standards in two states.
C. mixed CATs and rate regulation
Finally, we consider the case of mixed regulation in which some states adopt 
CATs and other states adopt rate standards. Under the Clean Power Plan proposals, 
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states can choose what type of regulation to adopt and a mixture of CATs and rate 
standards could result. The model is readily extended to mixed regulation. In partic-
ular, the equilibrium electricity price is found from the set defined in equation (1) 
where the full marginal costs are  c i +  β i  p cs in a CAT state and  c i + ( β i −  σ s )  p cs in 
a rate standard state.
In theory, states could allow carbon trading across CATs and rate standards.17 
Generating one MWh from any relatively clean plant under a rate standard creates 
σ s −  β i permits, which are simply tons of carbon. These permits can then be pur-
chased by relatively dirty generators under a rate standard or any generator under a 
CAT. If state  s has a CAT and state  s′ has a rate standard, trading equates the price of 
carbon in each state, i.e., sets  p cs =  p cs′ . Setting the difference between aggregate 
certificate demand and supply equal to zero implies that the equilibrium certificate 
price is characterized by
(7)  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
  β i  q sit rS −  E s +  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
 ( β i −  σ s′ )  q  s ′ it rS = 0. 
This condition does not have a clear interpretation either as a cap or an emissions 
rate constraint.
D. Theoretical results
We first compare the merit orders under the different regulations. We define effi-
cient supply as the merit order which minimizes full social costs for any given level 
of generation. Note that efficient supply may not result in efficiency if the level of 
generation is inefficient. Our first result describes efficient supply; we then address 
efficiency in a corollary. All proofs are in the online Appendix.
RESULT 1 (Efficient Supply): The merit order is efficient (full social costs are 
minimized):
 (i) if all states adopt CATs and  p cs is sufficiently close to  τ for all  s ;
 (ii) if all states adopt rate standards,  p cs is sufficiently close to  τ for all  s , and  σ s 
is sufficiently close to  σ for all  s ; or
 (iii) if there is mixed regulation,  p cs is sufficiently close to  τ for all  s ,  σ s is suffi-
ciently close to  σ for all  s , and  |  c i +  β i τ −  c j −  β j τ  | > στ for all  i and  j .
This result shows sufficient conditions for the efficiency of supply. Importantly, 
the sufficient conditions become increasingly stringent across the regulations.
17 The Clean Power Plan discourages trading across regimes and none of our simulations model carbon trading 
across regimes. 
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For CATs, supply is efficient if the carbon price equals (or is close to) the social 
cost of carbon. Intuitively, the CAT can implement Pigouvian pricing if the cap is 
sufficiently stringent, but not too stringent.
For rate standards, supply can also be efficient. For a given carbon price, the 
CAT and rate standard induce the same merit order since  c i + ( β i −  σ s )  p cs <  c i′ + ( β i′ −  σ s )  p cs if and only if  c i +  β i  p cs <  c i′ +  β i′  p cs . Intuitively, the rate standard 
can induce the correct relative prices across the technologies because it simply shifts 
the full marginal costs down by a constant. However, supply efficiency for a rate 
standard requires that carbon prices equal the social cost of carbon and that the rate 
standards be equal across states. Note that these sufficient conditions will not be 
ensured by carbon trading alone but would also require explicit harmonization of 
the rate standards across states. Thus the sufficient conditions are more strict for rate 
standards than for CAT.
Surprisingly, Result 1 ( iii ) shows that mixed regulation can also attain the effi-
cient supply but only under more stringent conditions. This result is illustrated in 
panel C of Figure 1 for four technologies where some of each technology is subject 
to a CAT and some is subject to a rate standard of  σ and the carbon price is  τ . Note 
that within each technology, the implicit subsidy of the rate standard lowers the full 
marginal cost by  στ , so the rate-standard technology is dispatched first, e.g., gas 
under the rate standard is dispatched before gas under the CAT. As illustrated, the 
merit order is efficient, because all the gas-fired generation is used before the coal-
fired generation as demand increases.
However, the efficiency of supply only occurs because the full marginal 
costs are sufficiently different. If the full marginal costs are close, i.e., if 
 |  c C +  β C τ −  c G −  β G τ | < στ , then the merit order is not efficient. As illustrated 
in panel D of Figure 1 the full marginal costs are sufficiently close that the merit 
order is rate-standard gas, followed by rate-standard coal, then CAT gas, and then 
CAT coal. This merit order is “scrambled,” i.e., inefficient, because the full mar-
ginal social cost of gas-fired generation is less than the full marginal social cost of 
coal.18
Result 1 also highlights the importance of coordination across states. For CATs, 
all carbon prices need to be sufficiently close to  τ , which can be ensured by car-
bon trading and a correct overall cap. Note that with carbon trading the distribution 
of the cap across states is irrelevant for efficiency of supply. With rate standards, 
trading can also ensure that carbon prices are equal across states. However, now 
the standards must be set equally across states in order for the merit order to be 
efficient, i.e., the distribution of the rate standards across the states is crucial. The 
result also shows an additional inefficiency if states fail to coordinate on a CAT or 
a rate standard.
This result also emphasizes the importance of carbon prices. Importantly, efficient 
supply depends on the carbon price being sufficiently close to  τ , but does not depend 
on the target emissions level or the target emissions rate. Thus, to attain efficient 
supply, the regulator would need to adjust the emissions cap or target  emissions rate 
18 This inefficiency from mixed regulation is limited because it only arises if full marginal costs are sufficiently 
close, i.e., if costs are small from the wrong merit order. 
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to maintain the carbon price equal to  τ . Unfortunately, the Clean Power Plan speci-
fies emissions rate targets rather than carbon price targets.
Although efficient supply is necessary for the overall efficiency of a regulation, it 
is not sufficient as the following corollary makes clear.
COROLLARy 1 (Efficiency): if demand is perfectly inelastic, then CATs, rate stan-
dards, or mixed regulation achieve efficiency if the merit order is efficient.
if demand is not perfectly inelastic, then CAT regulations achieve efficiency if 
 p cs = τ for all  s . rate standards and mixed regulation do not achieve efficiency.
This corollary, which demonstrates the superiority of CAT, echoes earlier results 
in the literature (e.g., see Helfand 1991; Kwoka 1983; Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 
2009). If demand is perfectly inelastic, then there is no consumption inefficiency 
and efficiency only requires efficient supply. However, if demand is not perfectly 
inelastic, then only a CAT regulation with a carbon price of  τ can attain the first 
best.19
Given the importance of equal carbon prices in Result 1, the next result addresses 
the benefits from carbon trading, which equates carbon prices across regions.
RESULT 2 (Carbon Trading): Trading carbon between states reduces costs. Trading 
between states with CATs holds aggregate emissions constant. Trading between 
states with rate standards may cause aggregate emissions to increase or decrease.
Result 2 shows that although carbon trading does reduce costs, it may not have 
clear efficiency benefits. It is well known that under CAT aggregate emissions are 
held constant and thus a reduction in costs leads to a clear efficiency gain, i.e., CAT 
is cost effective.
Under rate standards, Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) show aggregate emis-
sions could increase or decrease, and thus the welfare effects of carbon trading are 
indeterminate. For example, consider a state with an inelastic supply of relatively 
clean generation but elastic supply of dirty generation. This state will primarily 
respond by reducing dirty generation, which would lower overall emissions. If this 
state trades carbon with a state with an elastic supply of relatively clean (but not zero 
carbon) generation, then the resulting increase in relatively clean generation could 
lead to an overall increase in emissions. The welfare effects would need to compare 
any cost savings from carbon trading with this increase in emissions and hence are 
ambiguous.
We next compare the equilibrium outcomes across policies in which all states 
adopt the same policy. We analyze electricity prices, consumer surplus, and profits 
to “uncovered generators,” namely, generators which are not covered by the regula-
tion, e.g., renewables or distributed generation.
19 Holland (2012) shows that rate standards can attain the first best if they are coupled with an electricity tax of 
στ . Furthermore, he shows that in a second-best setting all these policies may fail to attain efficiency and the best 
policy is not theoretically clear. 
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RESULT 3 (Prices, Consumer Surplus, and Uncovered Generator Profits): For a 
given carbon price  p cs > 0 :
 ( i ) electricity prices are higher under CATs than under either rate standards or no 
regulation, i.e.,  p t CAT ≥  p t rS and  p t CAT ≥  p t BAu , and electricity prices under 
rate standards or under mixed regulation can be either higher or lower than 
under no regulation;
 ( ii ) consumer surplus is lower under CATs than under either rate standards or no 
regulation, i.e.,  C S CAT ≤ C S rS and  C S CAT ≤ C S BAu , and consumer surplus 
under rate standards or under mixed regulation can be either higher or lower 
than under no regulation; and
 ( iii ) profits for uncovered generation are higher under CATs than under either rate 
standards or no regulation, and profits for uncovered generation under rate 
standards or under mixed regulation can be either higher or lower than under 
no regulation.
Result 3 shows that a rate standard will generally be preferred by consumers, 
but that uncovered generators will generally prefer a CAT. The intuition follows 
directly from the electricity prices. For a given carbon price, the result shows 
that electricity prices are higher under a CAT but can be higher or lower than 
BAU prices under rate standards. These price comparisons follow from a com-
parison of the full marginal costs under the policies. Since full marginal costs are 
higher under CAT than under rate standards or BAU, the electricity price is higher. 
Similarly, since the full marginal costs under rate standards can be higher or lower 
than under BAU, the electricity prices are similarly higher or lower. The results 
on consumer surplus and profits of uncovered generation follow directly from the 
result on prices.
The result on uncovered generation is important since significant generation 
capacity may not be covered by the Clean Power Plan, e.g., hydro, nuclear, and some 
combined heat and power. The result shows that these uncovered generators will 
prefer CAT regulation because they would benefit from the higher electricity prices. 
The effect is somewhat different for “dirty” and “clean” uncovered generators. For 
dirty uncovered generators, the benefit arises from the higher electricity prices and 
because the lack of carbon regulation does not increase their costs. For clean uncov-
ered generators, the difference arises from the higher electricity prices and because 
the lack of carbon regulation does not decrease their costs under rate standards. The 
inability to sell carbon credits under a rate standard implies that uncovered clean 
generation prefers CAT. Note that this result also implies that incentives are stron-
gest under CAT for new clean generation and for efficiency improvements, both of 
which might be uncovered by the Clean Power Plan.
The result also has important implications for investment incentives. Investment 
will occur in the most profitable locations. New fossil fuel-fired generation may 
be “uncovered” since it is subject to other regulations, e.g., Section 111(b) of the 
Clean Air Act, and may not be subject to the Clean Power Plan. Small combined 
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heat and power will also likely not be covered by the Clean Power Plan. Efficiency 
improvements may also not be covered. The result implies that there would be more 
investment in uncovered generation under CAT regulation than under rate standards.
We next analyze the incentives for states to adopt either CATs or rate standards 
by analyzing the outcomes if states coordinate on either a single CAT or a single rate 
standard. To focus the analysis, we assume additionally that carbon prices equal  τ 
and rate standards are equal across states, i.e., we assume efficient supply.
RESULT 4 (Adoption Incentives of a Coalition): Suppose that all states adopt the 
same regulation, i.e., all states have a unified CAT or unified rate standard. Suppose 
further that the CAT or rate standard results in a carbon price equal to the social cost 
of carbon across both regimes and across all states, i.e.,  p cs = τ for all  s , and that 
rate standards are equal across states, i.e.,  σ s = σ for every  s . The following results 
hold:
 ( i )  p t CAT ≤  p t rS + στ  for all  t ;
 ( i i)  q sit CAT ≤  q sit rS  for all  s ,  i , and  t ;
 ( i ii)  π si CAT ≤  π si rS  for all  s and  i ;
 ( iv )  W CAT ≥  W rS ;  and
 (v)  T r CAT  +  τ (Carbo n rS  −  Carbo n CAT ) ≥  (C S rS  −  C S CAT )  +   ( π rS  −   π CAT ) .
If additionally we assume that demand is perfectly inelastic, then each of the 
weak inequalities above is an equality.
When states act in a coalition, this result shows that although welfare is maxi-
mized under CAT instead of a rate standard, the direct revenue from carbon permit 
sales may not be enough to compensate consumers and producers for lost surplus 
and profit. The intuition follows from noting that under these assumptions the merit 
order is unchanged and full marginal costs are lower by  στ under the rate standard, 
which implies that the market supply is simply shifted down by  στ . If demand were 
perfectly inelastic, equilibrium prices would fall by exactly this amount. If demand 
is not perfectly inelastic, then a price which is lower by  στ could result in excess 
demand. Thus the price difference between the CAT and rate standard is at most  στ .
Because the market supply shifts down, generation must be (weakly) higher 
under the rate standard for each generator for each hour (Result 4( ii )). This has 
additional implications for carbon emissions and generation costs, which are both 
higher under the rate standard.
The comparison of profits in Result 4( iii ) follows because the market supply 
shifts down by  στ and the price falls by at most  στ . Thus producer surplus (i.e., 
generator profit) is higher under the rate standard for each generator.
The inefficiency of rate standards, described in Corollary 1, implies the result on 
welfare in Result 4( iv ). Rewriting this in Result 4( v ) shows that the sum of carbon 
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market revenue and the increase in carbon market damages exceeds the sum of the 
increases in consumer surplus and profit under rate standards.
With perfectly inelastic demand this equality becomes  C S CAT + T r CAT = C S rS , 
which shows that the gain in consumer surplus from a rate standard is exactly the fore-
gone carbon market revenue  T r CAT . In this case, the carbon market revenue is exactly 
sufficient to compensate consumers for the lost consumer surplus under CATs.
If demand is not perfectly inelastic, the inequality in (v) is less informative about 
the ability of carbon market revenue to compensate consumers and producers for 
their losses under the CAT. In particular, it shows that carbon market revenue plus 
the additional carbon damages would be sufficient to compensate both producers 
and consumers for their losses under the CAT. However, the result suggests that 
it is an empirical question whether or not carbon market revenue by itself will be 
sufficient to compensate both producers and consumers for their losses under CAT.
E. incentives for regulatory Choice
We now turn to the adoption incentives of an individual state. In particular the 
question of how a state’s choice interacts with other states’ choices to influence eco-
nomic outcomes. This question could be directly addressed by the previous results 
if carbon prices were exogenous to the specific mechanism, for example, if states 
adjusted the CATs or rate standards so that the carbon prices always equaled the 
social cost of carbon.
For exogenous carbon prices, Result 4 is a good guide to the adoption incentives 
of a single state.20 As in Result 4 ( i ), if the state adopted a rate standard instead of a 
CAT, electricity prices would be lower in any hour in which that state’s generators 
were marginal, but the electricity price would be lower by at most  σ s τ . Since genera-
tors’ costs would be lower by  σ s τ , generators’ profits would be higher under the rate 
standard. With lower electricity prices, consumer surplus would also be higher under 
a rate standard. Thus consumers and covered generators would prefer that their state 
adopt the rate standard regardless of what other states do. In other words, adoption of 
a rate standard would be a dominant strategy from the perspective of covered gener-
ators or consumers. On the other hand, carbon market revenue and higher electricity 
prices from CAT imply that CAT adoption would be a dominant strategy from the 
perspective of government revenues and of uncovered generators. Thus, with fixed 
carbon prices, some perspectives would have a dominant strategy for adoption of a 
CAT but others would have a dominant strategy for adoption of a rate standard.
Since the Clean Power Plan specifies emissions and emissions rates rather than 
carbon price targets, carbon prices are likely endogenous to the regulatory choices 
of neighboring states. This complicates a single state’s adoption decision. We assess 
these incentives more thoroughly in our numerical simulations; however, a few 
examples illustrate the possibilities. Suppose a state were to consider a CAT when 
all its neighbors adopt a rate standard. Without a carbon price response, the full mar-
ginal costs would be higher under the CAT and thus the state’s generators would be 
20 Result 5 in online Appendix A extends Result 4 to analyze the adoption incentives of a single state assuming 
carbon prices are fixed at  τ . 
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dispatched less frequently, and there would be an excess supply of carbon permits. 
This implies that the state’s carbon price would be lower if it adopted a CAT instead 
of an equivalent rate standard, thereby making CAT more attractive from some per-
spectives.21 On the other hand, a state choosing a rate standard when its neighbors 
are under CAT could experience either an increase or decrease in its carbon price, 
depending upon the mix of available supply in that state. For example if the rate 
state had excess “clean” generation capacity (e.g., gas generation with an emissions 
rate below the state’s standard) then increasing exports from those clean sources 
would relax the rate standard constraint and hence lower carbon prices. Finally, we 
can construct an example where adoption of mixed regulations lowers carbon prices 
for both CAT and rate states. Compliance costs and electricity prices would then be 
lower compared to a uniform CAT scheme.
A state’s adoption incentives will hence involve a combination of carbon price 
effects in addition to the effects outlined in Result 4. To assess the direction and 
magnitude of these effects, we turn to a numerical simulation model.
III. Numerical Simulations
The theoretical model describes the inefficiencies which can result when states 
choose CAT regulation or rate standards across an integrated product market. As 
described above, there are several additional considerations to the actual Clean 
Power Plan that are difficult to capture in a theoretical model, including the het-
erogeneity of both supply technologies and emissions limits across states, and 
importantly, the endogeneity of carbon prices to a market’s choice of regulatory 
mechanism. We approach this richer set of issues using numerical simulation meth-
ods applied in the context of the electricity market in the western United States.22 
In this section, we present the simulation model and the data used to parameterize 
the model. Additional details on the numerical simulation are in online Appendix C.
A. Optimization model and Constraints
Because we assume firms act in a manner consistent with perfect competition in 
both the electricity and emissions permit markets, market equilibrium is equivalent 
to the solution of a social planner’s problem. Our social planner’s problem max-
imizes gross consumer surplus less generation costs subject to various operating 
constraints. Using the notation developed above, the planner’s objective is thus:23
(8)  max  q sit  
  CS +  ∑ 
s
  ∑ 
i
  ∑ 
t
 (  p t −  c i )  q sit . 
The generation costs in equation (8) are comprised of the marginal operating 
costs for existing and new generation (taken from sources described in the online 
21 Intuitively, the state can achieve compliance through importing. 
22 We utilize an electricity transmission and supply model similar to that used in Bushnell and Chen (2012); and 
Bushnell, Chen, and Zaragoza-Watkins (2014). 
23 The objective does not consider carbon damages, which are addressed through the constraints. 
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Appendix) and annualized capital costs for new generation capacity. Maximization 
of equation (8) is subject to generation, transmission, and policy constraints. 
Generation constraints reflect installed capacity adjusted proportionally for the prob-
ability of a forced outage of each unit from the generator availability data system.
The model allows for market-based investment in new natural gas and wind gen-
eration capacity. The availability of a new wind resource is subject to an hourly gen-
eration profile that is specific to each region and taken from data sources described 
in the online Appendix. For both technologies, the objective function in equation (8) 
includes an annualized per-MW cost of capital, and the hourly output and mar-
ginal cost of new units. The resulting equilibrium condition equates the capital cost 
to the net operating profit of a technology, or  C i ×  K i =  ∑ t   q it × (  p t − Fm C si ) , 
where  i is a technology with capital cost  C i and full marginal cost (including carbon) 
 Fm C si , and  q it ≤  K i × avai l t is the output of technology  i , which is constrained to 
not exceed the installed capacity (adjusted for availability).
Our transmission constraints replicate centralized locational marginal pricing 
(LMP). Any LMP price differences are arbitraged away subject to the constraints 
of the transmission network. Optimization of equation (8) is therefore subject 
to constraints on the flows between five transmission regions represented in our 
model. These constraints are governed by existing line capacities. See online 
Appen dix C3 for more detail on our modeling of transmission constraints. 
Transmission fees and line losses are implicitly captured by our BAU simulation 
and assumed to be constant across the different policy scenarios.
The carbon policies are modeled with additional constraints. BAU is modeled 
by optimizing equation (8) subject to the generation and transmission constraints. 
Under CAT regulation in state  s , total emissions in the state must also be less than 
allowed emissions, i.e., the policy constraint is  ∑ i   ∑ t   β i  q sit ≤  E s . If two states 
harmonize their CAT regulations through emissions trading, aggregate emissions 
across the two states must be less than total allowed emissions. The shadow values 
of the constraints are the carbon prices that would result from implementation with 
market mechanisms. Similarly, if state  s adopts a rate standard, then the emissions 
rate in the state must be less than the allowed emissions rate. If two states harmonize 
their rate standards, then the constraint is on the aggregate emissions rate. Note that 
this is equivalent to allowing carbon trading plus harmonizing the allowed emissions 
rates. The shadow values are again the carbon prices.24 In cases where both rate and 
CAT standards coexist we assume no trading of emissions credits across regimes.
B. Data Sources and Assumptions
The model uses cost and market data from the year 2007. Electricity demand 
levels and market prices for each region and hour are taken from public data sources 
described in online Appendix C. For tractability, hourly data are aggregated into 
representative periods which are weighted to calibrate market outcomes in terms of 
annual statistics. We assume linear demand where the intercept in each time period 
24 We write the rate standard constraints as  ∑ i   ∑ t   β i  q sit ≤  σ s  ∑ i   ∑ t   q sit so that the shadow value is in dollars 
per ton of carbon. 
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is  determined by the mean actual hourly electricity price and consumption level 
during that time period.25 Because electricity demand is extremely inelastic, we 
utilize an extremely low value for the slopes of the linear demand curve.26 The slope 
of the demand curve is set so that the median elasticity in each region is −0.05.27 
Consumer surplus is, as usual, the area under the demand and above the price.28
We explicitly model all fossil-fired generation monitored by the EPA’s continuous 
emissions monitoring system (CEMS). These constitute almost all the units whose 
emissions would be regulated under the Clean Power Plan, i.e., covered generation. 
The marginal cost of a modeled generation unit is assumed to be the sum of its fuel 
and variable operation and maintenance (VO&M) costs, taken from data sources 
described in online Appendix C. We calculate fuel costs for each unit as a constant 
heat rate (mmBtu/MWh) multiplied by regional average fuel price, up to the capac-
ity of the unit. We use unit average heat rates and regional average fuel prices taken 
from the Platts PowerDat dataset. Emissions rates, measured as tons CO2/MWh, are 
based upon the fuel-efficiency (heat rate) of a plant and the CO2 intensity of the fuel 
burned by that plant.
We first use natural gas prices from 2007 to establish if the simulation reasonably 
captures generation and emissions totals over western states. Because we separately 
calibrate demand and supply before aggregating demand, our simulation does not 
exactly replicate 2007 market outcomes. Online Appendix Table D9 shows that our 
predicted uncovered generation, covered generation, and emissions each match actual 
2007 levels to within 2 percent. The results reported here utilize natural gas prices 
that are, on average, $2/mcf lower, to better capture current fuel price conditions.
Investment in our simulations is based on information from the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory. We assume the annualized capital cost of new natu-
ral gas combined-cycle units is $100 KW-yr. Operating costs for the  combined-cycle 
gas  c st depend on natural gas prices and are assumed to be $48/MWh under 2007 
gas prices and $32/MWh under current gas prices. The annualized capital cost of a 
new wind turbine is $200 KW-yr. We assume that wind turbines have no marginal 
operating costs, but their output is constrained by wind availability. We use data on 
projected capacity factors of new wind plants taken from a WECC dataset used in 
Bushnell (2010). These capacity factors, which capture the intermittency of wind 
generation, vary by every hour and subregion in the simulation. The average capac-
ity factor for a new wind plant is about 35 percent. The capacity factors vary con-
siderably by region, approaching 40 percent in the Rocky Mountains but averaging 
only 28 percent in the Southwest.
25 The intercept is the sum of mean consumption and the product of the mean price and demand slope. 
26 The inelasticity of demand reflects in part the imperfect pass-through of wholesale prices to end-use electric-
ity consumers. 
27 The low elasticity is chosen in part to reflect the imperfect pass-through of wholesale prices to retail rates. 
Because the market is modeled as perfectly competitive, the results are relatively insensitive to the elasticity 
assumption, as price is set at the marginal cost of system generation and the range of prices is relatively modest. We 
discuss this assumption in the online Appendix. 
28 Inelastic linear demand implies unrealistically large consumer surplus triangles, which we arbitrarily truncate 
above $100 per MWh. Because we are mainly interested in changes in consumer surplus relative to BAU, this 
assumption is unimportant. For state-level demand and consumer surplus calculations, we use EIA data on annual 
consumption by state to calculate the fraction of a region’s demand that is attributable to a given state. This approx-
imation assumes that the hourly distribution of regional demand amongst states is the same as the annual average. 
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Unfortunately, we lack data on the hourly generation from some other sources, 
namely, renewable resources, hydroelectric resources, nuclear, combined heat and 
power, and other small thermal resources. We infer aggregate hourly generation from 
these sources from the difference between regional hourly demand and fossil-fired 
generation after accounting for net imports. These sources, which primarily have 
very low or zero marginal costs, are assumed to have the same hourly generation 
in all of our simulations. We do not observe state imports for a given hour. Instead 
net imports are aggregated to the regional level within the western interconnection 
(WECC) and approximated from data on the hourly flow over key transmission lines 
between regions.
In some results we disaggregate the outcomes for supply between generation 
sources covered under the Clean Power Plan and “uncovered” sources. Covered 
sources include all modeled fossil fuel generation. For the CPP, the EPA has pro-
posed a formula that gives credit for output from new nuclear capacity as well as 
credits for renewable generation and energy efficiency. Such sources may be eligible 
to earn emissions credit payments by virtue of their emissions rates being below 
the emissions rate standard. However because of our data limitations we include all 
non-thermal sources in our “uncovered” category in the results below.
To model CO2 regulation under the CPP, we convert the EPA’s interim goals, 
which average 2022–2029 targets, into the equivalent rate and CAT standards for 
our simulation. To do this we assume that the carbon reductions would be equivalent 
if the electricity quantities were the same. In other words, we establish a baseline 
emissions quantity and MWh output for each state, which converts into a base-
line emissions rate by dividing the former by the latter. We apply the EPA’s man-
dated reduction percentage to this baseline emissions rate and calculate the rate 
standard for each state. For example, Arizona’s emissions rate is required to be 
reduced to 75.6 percent of its baseline emissions rate, so Arizona’s rate standard is 
0.756  × (1.3  × 1011 lbs. CO2)/(8.6  × 107 MWh).
The equivalent CAT regulation is the baseline emissions reduced by the same 
percentage. Our main scenarios assume new generation is included under the CAT 
regulation (but not the rate standard). To be consistent with the EPA’s calculations 
for new source complements, we increase the cap described above by an additional 
2.4 percent, which is the average increase allowed. For example, Arizona’s cap is 
0.756  × (1.3  × 1011 lbs. CO2)  × 1.024.
C. Caveats and Limitations
Our simulations capture many of the key elements that influence state choices and 
outcomes under the Clean Power Plan, such as short-run generation costs, transmis-
sion constraints, and investment in natural gas and wind generation. That said, there 
are some limitations to the model. We do not explicitly consider the opportunities 
for abatement from increasing the efficiency of coal-fired power plants or from state 
investments in energy efficiency. Further, we do not explicitly model other state 
level policies, such as renewable portfolio standards, or federal policies such as the 
production and investment tax credits that might influence the specific compliance 
strategy of a state. Finally, the generation mix has changed somewhat since 2007, 
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primarily through investment in new gas-fired generation. To the extent that these 
factors reduce the need for relatively dirty generation, they lower compliance costs. 
However, the relative effects on costs across the policies are less clear.
We also make several simplifying assumptions in reporting our simulation 
results. To calculate carbon damages, we use a social cost of carbon equal to 
$43/MT, consistent with EPA regulatory filings. We do not include damages from 
other co-pollutants. Including co-benefits would increase welfare relative to the sta-
tus quo in all policy scenarios and could change the scenario rankings. Next, while 
we separately report producer and consumer surplus, the division of surplus likely 
depends on whether generation in a given state falls under rate regulation. In reg-
ulated states, producer surplus may largely accrue to consumers. Consumer sur-
plus is calculated and reported for the wholesale electricity markets. This implicitly 
assumes wholesale prices are eventually passed through to end users but diluted to 
some extent by the regulation of retail rates. The dilution of wholesale price fluc-
tuations is one reason we utilize a relatively low demand elasticity. We also do not 
model the myriad inefficiencies of retail electricity pricing. For instance, if retail 
prices are inefficiently high, a rate standard that does not increase electricity prices 
as much may be less inefficient. Finally, our calculations abstract away from tax 
interaction effects and double-dividend style benefits (Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 
1997), which may be larger under CAT compared to rate standards. To get a sense 
of the size of the potential double-dividend, we separately report carbon market 
revenue, which could in principle be given to generators, consumers or taxpayers.
IV. Simulation Results
We present simulation results from scenarios that span the states’ policy options 
under the CPP, e.g., rate standard versus CAT regulation and coordinated versus 
mixed regulation. To reduce the number of possible policy combinations, some 
results collect states into possible regional groups. We consider a group of “Coastal” 
states, (California, Oregon, and Washington) and “Inland” states: Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Wyoming, and Utah. This division is some-
what reflective of current policy discussions.29
Following the theory model, we first discuss the supply-side effects of regulations 
on the generation merit order. Then, we analyze equilibrium outcomes under each 
policy and incentives to form coalitions. Finally, we explore incentives for invest-
ment in new capacity under different regulations.
A. Supply-Side Effects
Figures 2–5 illustrate how various policy options affect the full marginal costs 
and how the merit order can be scrambled. Figure 2 compares the full marginal costs 
of existing fossil fuel generation units under West-wide CAT and rate  standards 
29 California, Oregon, and Washington are currently members of the Pacific Coast Collaborative, which seeks 
cooperative action in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. They are the only WECC states participating in this 
initiative. 
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to the market supply under BAU (i.e., the generating units are sorted along the 
x-axis by BAU marginal costs). The generating units to the left of 23 GW are pri-
marily coal-fired and the generating units to the right of 23 GW are gas-fired. The 
 West-wide CAT increases the full marginal costs of the units in proportion to their 
carbon emissions. Because coal is dirtier than gas, this changes the merit order, and 
some gas-fired generation is now cheaper than coal-fired generation and would be 
used first as demand increases.
The West-wide rate standard also increases costs in proportion to carbon emis-
sions, but includes an implicit output subsidy. The net effect increases the full 
marginal costs of the coal-fired generation but decreases the full marginal costs of 
gas-fired generation with emissions rates below the standard. Both the West-wide 
CAT and rate standard achieve approximately the same relative ordering of gener-
ation. This is consistent with theoretical Result 1 that both policies can eliminate 
the supply-side inefficiency. However, full marginal costs are too low under the rate 
standard.30
Figure 3 compares the coal and gas full marginal costs under state-by-state CAT 
standards with the supply curve for a West-wide CAT. The state-by-state CATs lead 
to full marginal costs that are too high in some states (those with tight caps) and too 
low in other states (those with loose caps). This heterogeneity “scrambles” the merit 
30 Our CAT simulation yields a permit price below the social cost of carbon. Under the rate standard, full mar-
ginal costs are lower than those under CAT and are often less than the unregulated case where carbon emissions 
are unpriced. 
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Figure 2. Full Marginal Costs: BAU and West-Wide CAT and Rate Standards
Note: Generating units sorted on x-axis by marginal costs under BAU (Scenario 0).
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order and is an additional source of inefficiency.31 Practically speaking, this can 
lead to very different dispatch ordering of similar generating units, which is clearly 
inefficient.
Figure 4 compares the full marginal cost when regional coalitions fail to coordi-
nate policies with the supply curve for a West-wide CAT. If Coastal states adopt a 
CAT standard and Inland states adopt a rate standard, the carbon prices are too low 
in both regions. The resulting merit order is not only scrambled, but the full mar-
ginal costs are also too low. This suggests the possibility of additional inefficiencies 
from mixed regulation, which we explore further below.
Finally, Figure 5 compares market supply under the West-wide CAT, West-wide 
rate standard, and BAU. Because wind capacity varies throughout the year, we plot 
a representative peak summer hour. Two features are worth noting. First, both CAT 
and the rate standard increase investment in wind generation, the leftmost portion 
of each curve, shifting out supply by about 8 GW relative to the no regulation case. 
Second, since CAT increases the full marginal cost of all fossil fuel generation, 
costs are higher than BAU for almost all generation levels despite the substantial 
investment in wind capacity. Because the rate standard decreases the full marginal 
cost of some gas generation and induces considerable wind investment, costs are 
often lower than BAU.
31 Online Appendix Figure E4 shows a similar “scrambling” of the merit order due to state-by-state rate 
standards. 
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Figure 3. Full Marginal Costs: West-Wide CAT Standards and State-by-State CAT Standards
Note: Generating units sorted on x-axis by full marginal costs under West-wide CAT standards (Scenario 1).
80 AmEriCAN ECONOmiC JOurNAL: ECONOmiC POLiCy mAy 2017
−20
0
40
80
120
$/M
W
h
0 20 40 60 80
Supply in GW
Inland  - mixed reg. (rate)
Coastal - mixed reg. (CAT)
West-wide CAT
0
40
80
120
$/M
W
h
0 20 40 60 80
Supply in GW
West-wide CAT
No regulation
West-wide rate standard
Figure 4. Full Marginal Costs: West-Wide CAT Standards and Mixed Regulation
Notes: Generating units sorted on x-axis by full marginal costs under West-wide CAT standards (Scenario 1). Mixed 
regulation has Coastal CAT standard and Inland rate standard.
Figure 5. Market Supply with New Investment: West-Wide CAT Standards and West-Wide Rate 
Standards
Note: Generating units sorted on x-axis by full marginal costs under each policy: CAT, no regulation, or rate 
standard.
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B. Equilibrium market impacts
These scrambled merit orders indicate the potential for inefficiency. To assess 
the magnitudes of any inefficiencies, Table 1 compares equilibrium outcomes from 
eight policy scenarios to BAU (“No Reg” or Scenario 0). Scenarios 1 through 8 
vary which states or regions operate under CAT and rate standards and whether 
regulations are harmonized. Online Appendix C8 presents a subset of outcomes for 
individual states.
First, consider the two West-wide policies: a West-wide CAT (Scenario 1) and 
a West-wide rate standard (Scenario 3). Consistent with theory, average electricity 
prices relative to BAU are higher under CAT and lower under a rate standard. As 
expected, electricity consumption relative to BAU is lower under CAT but higher 
under the rate standard. These electricity prices and consumption translate into 
effects on consumer surplus and generator profits that are also consistent with the 
theoretical results. The difference in consumer surplus between the scenarios is 
mostly accounted for by the carbon market revenue and higher profits to uncovered 
generators, thus the private surplus loss (or abatement cost) is quite similar across 
the two policies ($1.11 versus $1.34 billion relative to BAU).
To compare the efficiency of these two scenarios, first note that the carbon prices 
(marginal abatement costs) are similar ($21.07 versus $21.86 per MT), so any 
 supply-side inefficiencies should be modest (as suggested by Figure 2). Moreover, 
these carbon prices are well below the social cost of carbon ($43 per MT), so both 
Table 1—Equilibrium Outcomes for Business as Usual and Eight Policy Scenarios
No  
Reg. CAT CATs Rate Rates
CAT  
rate
CAT  
rates
Rate  
CAT
Rates 
CAT
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Electricity price ($/MWh) $41.83 $48.03 $47.41 $36.44 $36.09 $35.89 $35.74 $43.82 $43.81
Electricity quantity (GWh) 787,472 −4,178 −3,955 +3,780 +3,949 +3,993 +4,068 −1,389 −1,419
 New natural gas gen. cap. (MW) 2,017 −2,017 −139 −2,017 −2,017 −2,017 −2,017 +179 +965
 New wind gen. cap. (MW) 875 +14,550 +10,141 +17,334 +19,105 +17,130 +17,591 +8,799 +7,946
Emissions (MMT) 330.79 −70.58 −70.58 −79.11 −64.99 −65.83 −57.47 −53.52 −51.60
CAT permit price ($/MT) $21.07 $19.83 $0.00 $0.00 $19.59 $19.51
Rate permit price ($/MT) $21.86 $22.48 $21.00 $20.82 $9.18 $9.58
Consumer surplus ($ bn.) $44.41 −$4.88 −$4.37 +$4.27 +$4.41 +$4.56 +$4.70 −$1.39 −$1.41
Covered generator profits ($ bn.) $7.12 −$3.79 −$4.24 −$3.79 −$3.83 −$3.82 −$3.83 −$3.97 −$3.96
Uncovered generator profits ($ bn.) $13.90 +$2.06 +$1.89 −$1.81 −$1.93 −$1.95 −$2.04 +$0.60 +$0.62
Transmission profits ($ bn.) $0.18 +$0.02 −$0.03 −$0.00 +$0.14 +$0.10 +$0.12 −$0.09 −$0.08
Generation costs ($ bn.) $11.91 +$0.92 +$1.16 +$1.48 +$1.36 +$1.26 +$1.21 +$0.96 +$0.95
Carbon market rev. ($ bn.) +$5.48 +$5.43 +$0.00 +$0.00 +$3.86 +$3.85
Abatement cost ($ bn.) −$1.11 −$1.32 −$1.34 −$1.21 −$1.11 −$1.05 −$1.00 −$0.99
Avg. abatement cost ($/MT) +$15.69 +$18.74 +$16.93 +$18.64 +$16.86 +$18.26 +$18.65 +$19.21
Carbon damages ($ bn.) $14.22 −$3.04 −$3.04 −$3.40 −$2.79 −$2.83 −$2.47 −$2.30 −$2.22
Social welfare ($ bn.) $51.39 +$1.93 +$1.71 +$2.06 +$1.58 +$1.72 +$1.42 +$1.30 +$1.23
No new source complements $51.39 +$2.16 +$1.95 +$2.06 +$1.58 +$1.72 +$1.42 +$1.44 +$1.34
Notes: Results from Scenarios 1–8 are reported as changes relative to Scenario 0. “+” indicates an increase and 
“−” indicates a decrease. “Abatement cost” is the sum of consumer surplus, profits (covered, uncovered, and trans-
mission), and carbon market revenue. Consumer surplus is calculated using a choke price of $100/MWh. Carbon 
damages assume a social cost of carbon equal to $43.
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policies are reducing carbon less than would be efficient.32 Due to the new source 
complements in the parameterization of the CAT, emissions reductions are actually 
smaller under the West-wide CAT (70.58 MMT, about 21 percent) than under the 
West-wide rate standard (79.11 MMT, about 24 percent). Because the emissions 
reduction is more modest and because the policy can be efficient, the West-wide 
CAT has the lowest average abatement cost of all the policies. The West-wide rate 
standard, by reducing carbon emissions more, actually results in the highest welfare 
gain ($2.06 billion relative to BAU).33
Relaxing the West-wide CAT by including new source complements was 
intended to prevent leakage to new capacity. However, loosening the cap has an 
efficiency cost. Modeling “No New Source Complements” shows that a West-wide 
CAT, which achieves the same emissions reduction as the West-wide rate standard, 
would result in even larger gains in social welfare ($2.16 billion relative to BAU). 
This illustrates the inefficiency of the West-wide rate standard.
We next turn to cases where states fail to harmonize regulations. In particular, 
Scenario 2 shows state-by-state CATs and Scenario 4 shows state-by-state rate 
standards. Due to the idiosyncracies of the state-level targets in the CPP, failure to 
harmonize policies results in substantial inefficiencies. Compared to the  West-wide 
policies, state-by-state policies have higher average abatement costs ($18.74 versus 
$15.69 per MT, 19 percent higher and $18.64 versus $16.93 per MT, about 10 per-
cent higher) despite the state-by-state rate standard having a smaller carbon reduc-
tion. These high abatement costs translate directly into lower social welfare gains, 
which illustrates the efficiency costs of the failure to harmonize regulations.
Scenarios 5 through 8 investigate mixed regulation under which some states adopt 
CATs and some states adopt rate standards. First consider Scenario 5 (“CAT Rate” 
in which the Coastal region adopts a harmonized CAT and the Inland region adopts 
a harmonized rate standard) and Scenario 7 (“Rate CAT” in which the policies are 
reversed).34 The mixed regulations introduce the possibility for emissions to “leak” 
to the rate standard region. In Scenario 5, leakage is so severe that the carbon price 
in the Coastal CAT is zero, i.e., the cap is non-binding, and emissions reductions are 
much smaller.35 In Scenario 7, leakage is not so severe as to result in a zero carbon 
price, however, emissions reductions are quite small (54 MMT) and welfare gains 
are eroded to $1.30 billion. Overall, average abatement costs are between 7 and 
21 percent higher compared to a West-wide CAT.
Scenarios 6 and 8 illustrate policy failures across two dimensions: mixed regu-
lation and a failure to harmonize rate standards. Not surprisingly, these scenarios 
32 In an earlier version of this paper, our simulations did not allow for the option of building new wind capacity. 
In that case, compliance costs were $30 per ton of CO2 and electricity prices were nearly $20 per MWh higher, 
despite less aggressive carbon reductions. 
33 Our assumption of inelastic demand also minimizes the inefficiency of the West-wide rate standard. 
34 Given that California currently has a cap-and-trade system in place, we do not believe Scenarios 7 and 8 are 
realistic. However, they provide the basis for understanding the complete set of incentives. 
35 Given that California currently has in place a mass-based greenhouse gas law for electricity generators and 
Inland states are currently unregulated, one may worry adoption of a rate standard by the Inland states would 
magnify leakage from the Coast to the Inland region. In unreported results, available upon request, we simulate a 
Coastal CAT and unregulated Inland region. Imports to the Coastal region do increase relative to our BAU scenario, 
however these imports from the Inland region to the Coast are smaller than under Scenarios 5 and 6. Therefore the 
rate standard applied to the Inland states does indeed exacerbate the problem of emissions leakage. 
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result in the highest average abatement costs and lowest social welfare gains of all 
the scenarios.
Overall, Table 1 shows substantial variation in electricity prices and carbon prices. 
In addition to direct effects, the electricity price variation also indicates transfers 
between consumers and producers. The carbon price variation indicates transfers 
between different types of producers with perhaps unintended consequences par-
ticularly on nuclear power.36 To the extent that these price-induced transfers are 
not offset by transfers of carbon market revenue, they are a salient indicator of the 
effects of the different scenarios on stakeholders.
Finally, our results suggest investment in renewable energy will be an import-
ant compliance option. In an earlier version of this work (Bushnell et al. 2015), 
we analyze compliance without investment. Relative to those results, investment 
reduces the disparity between marginal compliance costs in the state-by-state sce-
narios, reflecting the common option of wind investment available to all states. 
More importantly, the addition of new investment greatly magnifies the potential 
leakage that could be experienced under the “uncoordinated” regulations when one 
region adopts a cap and another adopts a rate standard. The addition of a zero  carbon 
investment option also greatly depresses power prices in regions adopting rate stan-
dards. This has important implications for consumers and profits for incumbent gen-
eration, particularly nuclear.
C. incentives to Form a West-Wide Coalition
Our simulations suggest efficiency is enhanced when states form regional trading 
markets. A natural question, then, is whether states will have the incentive to join 
such a coalition. To address this question, we focus on outcomes if the Coastal or 
the Inland states either join or unilaterally depart from a West-wide coalition. The 
game-theoretic “normal form” is a useful way to summarize payoffs holding fixed 
the actions of others. Because the incentives of stakeholders within each region may 
not necessarily align, Table 2 presents normal forms for four main outcomes: private 
surplus; consumer surplus; profits; and emissions.
Private surplus—panel A of Table 2—is the sum of consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, and carbon market revenue and thus captures the perspective of a regional 
planner focused on abatement costs. Under a West-wide CAT (Scenario 1) the pri-
vate surplus (i.e., abatement cost) is $1.1 billion less than BAU. However, this panel 
shows that this cost is not shared equally between the two regions, but rather more is 
borne by the Coastal region ($0.7 billion) than the Inland region ($0.5 billion). This 
division of the burden means that the Coastal region has an incentive to deviate from 
a West-wide CAT. Conversely, the burden of the  West-wide rate standard (Scenario 
3 with cost of $1.3 billion) is borne more heavily by the Inland region, who then 
have an incentive to unilaterally adopt a CAT. Thus neither a West-wide CAT nor a 
West-wide rate standard is a stable coalition. In fact, the only stable policy, from a 
private surplus perspective, is a mixed policy where the Coastal region adopts a rate 
36 Many nuclear plants are economically marginal (Davis and Hausman 2016), and therefore vulnerable to 
changes in electricity prices. 
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standard and the Inland region adopts a CAT. As we saw in Table 1, this stable policy 
(Scenario 7) has substantial efficiency costs.
Consumer surplus—panel B of Table 2—also casts doubt on the prospects for a 
West-wide coalition. Since CAT regulation results in high electricity prices, both 
regions would have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from a West-wide CAT. If 
carbon prices were fixed, Result 2 suggests that rate standards would yield the high-
est consumer surplus. However, when carbon prices are endogenous, the simulations 
show a West-wide rate standard is not a stable policy, because Coastal consumers 
would have an incentive to unilaterally deviate by adopting a CAT. The only stable 
policy from the consumer’s perspective, “CAT Rate” (Scenario 5) results in substan-
tial emissions leakage, a zero carbon price, and considerable inefficiency.
Generator profits—panel C of Table 2—is the only perspective in which West-
wide coordination results in stable policies. However, this is somewhat deceptive 
in that generator incentives do not necessarily align. Appendix Table D13 shows 
that covered generators prefer rate standards and hence would have an incentive to 
unilaterally deviate from a West-wide CAT. Conversely, online Appendix Table D14 
shows that uncovered generators prefer CAT, so would have an incentive to unilat-
erally deviate from a West-wide rate standard.
Emissions—panel D of Table 2— can be thought of as the environmental per-
spective. Alternatively, the normal form shows the considerable leakage that results 
Table 2—Adoption Incentives in the Coastal and Inland West
Panel A. Private surplus Panel C. Generator profits
Inland Inland
CAT Rate CAT Rate
C
oa
st
al
C
A
T −$0.68 , −$0.45 +$0.51 , −$1.72
C
oa
st
al
C
A
T +$0.96 , −$2.70 −$2.19 , −$3.59
R
at
e −$0.20 , −$0.71 +$0.71 , −$2.05
R
at
e +$0.41 , −$3.78 −$1.91 , −$3.70
Panel B. Consumer surplus Panel D. Emissions
Inland Inland
CAT Rate CAT Rate
C
oa
st
al
C
A
T −$2.93 , −$1.95 +$2.69 , +$1.87
C
oa
st
al
C
A
T −6.78 , −63.80 −13.52 , −52.31
R
at
e −$0.60 , −$0.79 +$2.62 , +$1.65
R
at
e +12.58 , −66.10 −6.94 , −72.17
Notes: “Private surplus” is the sum of consumer surplus, generator profits (covered and uncovered), and carbon 
market revenue and is measured in $ billion. Private surplus in Table 1 is the sum of regional private surplus and 
transmission profits. The panels above exclude transmission profits. Generator profits (covered and uncovered) 
and consumer surplus are measured in $ billion. Emissions are measured in million metric tons (MMT). All values 
are measured relative to business as usual (Scenario 0). “+” indicates an increase and “−” indicates a decrease. 
Consumer surplus is calculated using a choke price of $100/MWh. The double circles indicate the “best response” 
for each region.
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under mixed regulation. With a West-wide CAT, total emissions fall by 7 MMT in 
the Coastal region and by 64 MMT inland. However, if the Coastal region unilat-
erally switches to a rate standard, their emissions increase by over 19 MMT. Since 
Inland emissions would remain capped, this increase in emissions is not offset, and 
aggregate emissions increase substantially. Leakage similarly results in a substantial 
increase in aggregate emissions (5 MMT) for the mixed regulation where the Inland 
region unilaterally adopts the rate standard (Scenario 5). This illustrates the leakage 
that results when a West-wide coalition fails to form.
D. Entry incentives
The treatment of newly constructed fossil power plants in state compliance plans 
affects adoption incentives and efficiency. Technically, Section 111d of the Clean 
Air Act covers only existing sources. New sources are regulated separately and will 
have to comply with a source-specific CO2 emissions rate standard. Therefore, new 
natural gas capacity can safely be excluded from rate standard regulation under the 
CPP.37 However if states adopt CAT regulation, excluding new fossil fuel genera-
tion may create substantial scope for leakage. Because of this concern, the EPA is 
encouraging states who opt for CAT regulations to implement measures to limit 
leakage to new fossil fuel generation.
Table 3 analyzes investment in combined-cycle natural gas and wind capacity 
under different regulatory policies toward new generation. The first row breaks out 
the new capacity results in Table 1 for Scenarios 1, 3, 5, and 7 by region. When new 
generation is included in the state compliance plans (as our main results assume), 
there is substantial investment in wind capacity (9,000 to 17,000 MWs mostly 
Inland), but virtually no investment in natural gas (the 2,017 MW of natural gas that 
would have been constructed Inland in BAU is not constructed).
37 All rate standard scenarios exclude new natural gas capacity from the rate standard, consistent with the EPA’s 
belief that leakage concerns are minimal under rate-based regulation. 
Table 3—New Capacity under Four Policy Scenarios when New Natural Gas Combined Cycle 
Investment Is Included and Not Included under Mass-Based Regulation
New capacity 
(MW) 1–CAT (mass-based) 3–rate standard
5–coast CAT  
and inland rate
7–coast rate  
and inland CAT
Coast Inland Total Coast Inland Total Coast Inland Total Coast Inland Total
New gas gen. incl.
 Natural gas +0 −2,017 −2,017 +0 −2,017 −2,017 +0 −2,017 −2,017 +2,196 −2,017 +179
 Wind +0 +14,550 +14,550 +1,355 +15,979 +17,334 +0 +17,130 +17,130 +4,136 +4,663 +8,799
New gas gen. excl.
 Natural gas +5,045 +2,093 +7,138 +0 −2,017 −2,017 +0 −2,017 −2,017 +1,622 −982 +640
 Wind +0 +4,536 +4,536 +1,355 +15,979 +17,334 +0 +17,113 +17,113 +4,138 +5,419 +9,556
Notes: Results are reported as changes relative to new capacity built under business as usual, which has 2,017 MW 
of gas and 875 MW of wind. “+” indicates an increase and “−” indicates a decrease. Scenarios assume 10 percent 
load growth from 2006 levels. “New gas gen. incl./excl.” means new natural gas capacity is included or excluded 
under the CAT. New natural gas capacity is always excluded under the rate standard. New wind capacity is included 
under the rate standard and can be included or excluded under the CAT because it has zero emissions.
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Table 3 shows that if new natural gas is excluded from a West-wide CAT regu-
lation, over 9,000 MW of additional natural gas capacity is constructed, much of 
it occurring in the Coastal region. This additional natural gas capacity comes at 
the expense of wind capacity, which is 10,000 MW lower. This huge, inefficient 
investment in natural gas capacity (over 10 percent of total capacity) illustrates the 
importance of including new capacity in a CAT regulation. In fact, we estimate that 
excluding new capacity leads to approximately 9 percent more emissions relative to 
CAT where new capacity is included.
By assumption, excluding new capacity has no effect on the West-wide rate stan-
dard, but it can have substantial effects on mixed regulation. Excluding new capac-
ity from the CPP has essentially no effect when there is a Coastal CAT and Inland 
rate standard (Scenario 5), but this is because the CAT carbon price is zero in this 
scenario. In Scenario 7 (Coastal Rate and Inland CAT), excluding the new capacity 
results in substantial shifts in the location of the new natural gas capacity: about 
1,000 MW is constructed in the Inland CAT region but not in the Coastal region. 
However, overall investment is largely unaffected by the decisions to include or 
exclude new capacity from the CAT regulation. Thus the inefficiencies of mixed 
regulation seem to outweigh the leakage inefficiency from excluding new capacity 
under the CAT regulation. However, excluding new capacity from CAT regulation 
could substantially change investment patterns and potentially undermine the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the policy, especially the West-wide CAT.
E. Comparing the Proposed and Final rules
In June 2014, the EPA released the proposed Clean Power Plan and in August 
2015 the final version was released. There are several dimensions across which the 
proposed and final rules differ. Some of the changes, e.g., prohibiting trading across 
CAT and rate states, are primarily clarifications and are outside of the scope of our 
analysis. However, two important changes are relevant to our analysis. First, the 
EPA revised the calculation of the “best system of emission reduction” used to cal-
culate emissions reductions required under the plan.38 The final target calculations 
generally relax both the CAT and rate standard. Second, the final rule also includes 
“new source complements” which are intended to encourage states to adopt CAT 
and to include new natural gas capacity in the CAT regulation. New source comple-
ments further relax the CAT but have no effect on the rate standard.
We explore the effects of these changes in Table 4. To see the effect of the final 
target calculations, compare the rate standard outcomes under the proposed and 
final rules. Despite relaxing the targets, electricity prices, rate permit prices, and 
emissions reductions are all essentially the same. To see the effect of the new source 
complements, compare CAT outcomes under the proposed and final rules. If new 
natural gas capacity is included, emissions reductions are approximately 12 MMT 
38 As noted previously, the final rule eliminates energy efficiency as a fourth building block in the best system 
for emissions reduction. In response to stakeholder comments, the final rule changed several assumptions used to 
estimate the emissions reductions from heat rate improvement, re-dispatch, and increased generation from renew-
ables. The final rule also modified the calculation of state-specific emissions reduction targets. 
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less (4 percent of 331 MMT) under the final rule because of the new source com-
plements. Electricity prices are similar but permit prices are slightly lower under the 
final rule. If new natural gas capacity is excluded, there are no new source comple-
ments and effects are complicated by different amounts of leakage.
Whether the EPA’s use of new source complements could encourage CAT adop-
tion and mitigate leakage likely depends on how covered and uncovered generators 
are impacted. Under the proposed rule, covered and uncovered generators would 
each lose approximately $1.5 billion if new generation is excluded. Thus they might 
be relied upon to support including new generation in the CAT. However, under the 
proposed rule, covered generators would prefer rate regulation to CAT. The final 
rule, with the new source complements, ensures covered generators are indifferent 
between the CAT with new gas generation included and a rate standard. In addi-
tion, the final rule further increases covered generators’ profits, by about $160 mil-
lion, relative to when new gas capacity is excluded. Uncovered generators always 
prefer CAT when emissions from new generation are included to either rate stan-
dards of CAT when new sources are excluded. These effects should reduce covered 
Table 4 —Equilibrium Outcomes for the Final and Proposed Rules with and without Regulation of 
New Generation under CAT
Proposed rule Final rule
New gas gen. incl. New gas gen. excl. New gas gen. incl. New gas gen. excl.
No reg. CAT CATs CAT CATs Rate CAT CATs CAT CATs Rate
Electricity price ($/MWh) $41.83 $48.27 $47.60 $43.81 $43.44 $36.44 $48.03 $47.41 $43.83 $43.48 $36.44
Electricity quantity (GWh) 787,472 −4,332 −4,079 −1,422 −1,406 +3,779 −4,178 −3,955 −1,424 −1,403 +3,780
 New natural gas gen.  
  cap. (MW)
2,017 −2,017 −530 +7,210 +7,439 −2,017 −2,017 −139 +7,138 +5,549 −2,017
 New wind gen. cap.  
  (MW)
875 +16,218 +16,413 +4,698 +3,741 +17,588 +14,550 +10,141 +4,536 +5,310 +17,334
Emissions (MMT) 330.79 −82.50 −82.50 −47.90 −52.55 −80.44 −70.58 −70.58 −46.87 −59.40 −79.11
CAT permit price ($/MT) $22.23 $21.65 $19.50 $15.52 $21.07 $19.83 $19.43 $14.58
Rate permit price ($/MT) $21.99 $21.86
Consumer surplus ($ bn.) $44.41 −$5.04 −$4.52 −$1.41 −$1.17 +$4.27 −$4.88 −$4.37 −$1.42 −$1.19 +$4.27
Covered generator profits  
 ($ bn.)
$7.12 −$3.98 −$4.38 −$5.77 −$5.44 −$3.82 −$3.79 −$4.24 −$5.74 −$5.18 −$3.79
Uncovered generator  
 profits ($ bn.)
$13.90 +$2.13 +$1.94 +$0.62 +$0.57 −$1.81 +$2.06 +$1.89 +$0.62 +$0.57 −$1.81
Transmission profits  
 ($ bn.)
$0.18 +$0.00 −$0.02 −$0.09 −$0.10 −$0.01 +$0.02 −$0.03 −$0.09 −$0.10 −$0.00
Generation costs ($ bn.) $11.91 +$1.18 +$1.45 +$1.09 +$1.34 +$1.51 +$0.92 +$1.16 +$1.07 +$1.35 +$1.48
Carbon market rev. ($ bn.) +$5.52 +$5.36 +$5.52 +$4.77 +$5.48 +$5.43 +$5.52 +$4.52
Abatement cost ($ bn.) −$1.37 −$1.61 −$1.13 −$1.37 −$1.37 −$1.11 −$1.32 −$1.11 −$1.38 −$1.34
Avg. abatement cost  
 ($/MT) +$16.55 +$19.56 +$23.66 +$26.16 +$17.01 +$15.69 +$18.74 +$23.64 +$23.23 +$16.93
Carbon damages ($ bn.) $14.22 −$3.55 −$3.55 −$2.06 −$2.26 −$3.46 −$3.04 −$3.04 −$2.02 −$2.55 −$3.40
Social welfare ($ bn.) $51.39 +$2.18 +$1.93 +$0.93 +$0.89 +$2.09 +$1.93 +$1.71 +$0.91 +$1.17 +$2.06
Notes: Results from policy scenarios are reported as changes relative to no regulation. “+” indicates an increase 
and “−” indicates a decrease. “Abatement cost” is the sum of consumer surplus, profits (covered, uncovered, and 
transmission), and carbon market revenue. Consumer surplus is calculated using a choke price of $100/MWh. 
Carbon damages assume a social cost of carbon equal to $43. “Proposed rule” uses emissions targets comparable 
to the proposed rule. “Final rule” uses emissions targets comparable to the final rule in which targets are adjusted 
for new source complements if new natural gas capacity is included in the CAT. “New gas gen. incl./excl.” means 
new natural gas capacity is included or excluded under the CAT. New natural gas capacity is always excluded under 
the rate standard. New wind capacity is included under the rate standard and can be included or excluded under the 
CAT because it has zero emissions.
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generators’ resistance to adopting CAT regulation and could make both covered 
and  uncovered generators advocates for including new gas generation. Of course, 
whether or not the final rule is more successful than the proposed rule at encourag-
ing adoption of efficient regulation and limiting leakage depends on the responsive-
ness to these relatively minor changes.
V. Conclusion
There are many contexts in which environmental regulation and trade can inter-
act to undermine the efficiency of both. The EPA’s Clean Power Plan is a clear 
and timely example of these interactions. The CPP proposes major reductions in 
carbon emissions from generators of electricity, a good that is perfectly substitut-
able across neighboring states. The CPP establishes state-level targets for carbon 
emissions rates in lbs of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of electricity generated. 
States have a great deal of flexibility in how to achieve these goals. Because this 
flexibility creates different incentives, effects on consumers and producers within 
a state could be quite different depending on the type of regulation adopted both in 
that particular state as well as in other states because electricity is traded regionally 
across state lines. Further more, the states’ private incentives may be at odds with 
those of a social planner.
In this paper we have focused on the two likely market-based regulatory 
approaches that could be adopted by states, a mass-based (CAT) approach, and a 
rate standard. Our theoretical findings imply that efficiency is most likely achieved 
under CAT, and that a mix of CAT and rate standards is likely to create an inefficient 
“ordering” of generation resources. Further, we find that, while consumers in each 
state may prefer to coordinate on rate standards, producers can prefer to coordinate 
on inconsistent regulations, where different states adopt different approaches.
We investigate the importance of our theoretical findings using numerical sim-
ulations of the electricity market in the western United States. We find lack of 
coordination, when states independently pursue their own emissions targets with-
out regard to electricity trading partners, leads to large inefficiencies. For example 
under state-specific caps, average abatement costs are 19 percent higher than under 
a West-wide CAT. Under state-specific rate standards, average abatement costs are 
10 percent higher relative to a West-wide rate standard. Regional cooperation may 
not mitigate these concerns. When two regions of the West coordinate internally, but 
adopt different instruments, average abatement costs are between 7 and 22 percent 
higher than costs under a West-wide CAT. While generator incentives favor coordi-
nation, this may or may not lead to adoption of a West-wide CAT.
One unresolved aspect of the CPP is whether new natural gas generation is included 
under compliance plans when states adopt mass-based regulations. We examine the 
implications of the CPP on the construction of new natural gas and wind generation 
under a medium-term outlook where demand grows by 10 percent relative to 2007 
levels. Whether new plants are covered under the CPP can dramatically change where 
new plants are built. When new plants are excluded from CPP compliance, new gas 
plants are built in place of new wind generation. Under mixed regulation, including 
new plants can shift new generation out of CAT regions toward rate regions.
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Overall, our findings indicate that despite the opportunities the CPP provides for 
states to coordinate and implement compliance plans that can efficiently achieve 
their joint targets, the incentives of individual states to participate in those plans are 
conflicted. Indeed, there can easily be circumstances when states find it in their own 
interest to adopt a regulatory approach that is contrary to those of its neighbors.
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